Congestion-Aware Distributed Network Selection for Integrated Cellular
  and Wi-Fi Networks by Cheung, Man Hon et al.
Congestion-Aware Distributed Network Selection
for Integrated Cellular and Wi-Fi Networks
Man Hon Cheung, Fen Hou, Member, IEEE, Jianwei Huang, Fellow, IEEE, and Richard Southwell
Abstract—Intelligent network selection plays an important role
in achieving an effective data offloading in the integrated cellular
and Wi-Fi networks. However, previously proposed network
selection schemes mainly focused on offloading as much data
traffic to Wi-Fi as possible, without systematically considering the
Wi-Fi network congestion and the ping-pong effect, both of which
may lead to a poor overall user quality of experience. Thus, in
this paper, we study a more practical network selection problem
by considering both the impacts of the network congestion and
switching penalties. More specifically, we formulate the users’
interactions as a Bayesian network selection game (NSG) under
the incomplete information of the users’ mobilities. We prove that
it is a Bayesian potential game and show the existence of a pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium that can be easily reached. We then
propose a distributed network selection (DNS) algorithm based
on the network congestion statistics obtained from the operator.
Furthermore, we show that computing the optimal centralized
network allocation is an NP-hard problem, which further justifies
our distributed approach. Simulation results show that the DNS
algorithm achieves the highest user utility and a good fairness
among users, as compared with the on-the-spot offloading and
cellular-only benchmark schemes.
Index Terms—Mobile data offloading, cellular and Wi-Fi
integration, Bayesian potential game, network selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of mobile video and web applications,
consumer demands for wireless data services are growing
rapidly, to a point that the cellular network capacity is pushed
to its limit. According to Cisco’s forecast, mobile data traffic
will increase to 30.6 exabytes per month by 2020, which corre-
sponds to an 8-fold increase between 2015 and 2020 globally
[2]. The cellular network capacity, however, is growing at a
much slower pace, and cannot keep up with the explosive
growth in data traffic. A cost-effective and timely solution
for alleviating the cellular network congestion problem is to
use some complementary technologies, such as Wi-Fi or small
cells, to offload the cellular traffic. In fact, Cisco predicted that
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the percentage of offloaded traffic will grow and exceed that
of the cellular traffic, reaching an offloading ratio of 55% of
the global mobile traffic by 2020 [2]. Owing to the existing
popularity of Wi-Fi usage and deployment1, we will focus
on the network selection in the integrated cellular and Wi-Fi
networks in this paper.
Through the current ongoing standardization efforts, such as
the access network discovery and selection function (ANDSF)
and Hotspot 2.0 [3], [4], the cellular and Wi-Fi networks
are becoming more tightly coupled with each other. More
specifically, under this cellular and Wi-Fi integration, the Wi-
Fi networks would usually be owned and managed by the
cellular operator, who ensures a seamless connectivity for
the users. Also, the same operator will be responsible for
making all the network selections silently in the background,
so a user does not need to know whether he is connected
to the cellular or Wi-Fi network. Furthermore, the operator
will ensure that all functionality and services are consistently
available regardless of whether the user is on cellular or Wi-Fi.
Intelligent network selection plays a critical role in the
integrated cellular and Wi-Fi networks, to achieve an effective
mobile data offloading and improve the users’ quality of
experience (QoE). One popular choice that is used by many
smartphones by default is the on-the-spot offloading (OTSO)
scheme, where the device simply offloads its data traffic to a
Wi-Fi network whenever possible, and only uses the cellular
network if no Wi-Fi exists (or the Wi-Fi interface is turned
off). The OTSO scheme is simple to implement but has two
possible drawbacks. First, under the OTSO policy, devices that
are in close proximity may choose the same Wi-Fi network,
hence experience the network congestion and achieve low
throughput, especially during the peak hours in some densely
populated areas. In other words, this users’ herd behaviour
without any coordination leads to the Wi-Fi network conges-
tion [5]. Second, a user may incur a switching penalty in the
forms of switching time and a switching cost when it switches
between different networks. The switching time corresponds
to the delay during handoff, and the switching cost accounts
for the additional power consumption and QoE disruption [6].
Without taking into account this switching penalty, a network
selection policy may result in the ping-pong effect [4] with
too frequent network switching, which leads to a throughput
reduction and faster battery degradation.
Although network congestion and switching penalty are
two important factors in the design of an effective intelligent
1From Cisco’s data, 64.2 million public Wi-Fi hotspots have already
installed since 2015 [2].
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2network selection algorithm, most prior related literature,
including [7]–[11], neglected the effects of these two factors.
Balasubramanian et al. in [7] proposed that a user can per-
form data offloading by making predictions of future Wi-Fi
availability using the past mobility history. Lee et al. in [8]
described the on-the-spot offloading (OTSO) scheme that most
smartphones are using today by default. Ristanovic et al. in
[9] considered an energy-efficient offloading for delay-tolerant
applications. They proposed to extract typical users’ mobility
profiles for the prediction of Wi-Fi availabilities. Im et al.
in [10] considered the cost-throughput-delay tradeoff in user-
initiated Wi-Fi offloading. Given the predicted future usage
and the availability of Wi-Fi, the proposed system decides
which application should offload its traffic to Wi-Fi at a given
time, while taking into account the cellular budget constraint of
the user. Moon et al. in [11] implemented a new transport layer
to handle network disruption and delay for the development of
delay-tolerant Wi-Fi offloading apps, by scheduling multiple
flows to meet their deadlines with the maximal Wi-Fi usage.
Furthermore, although the studies in [12]–[15] took the net-
work congestion into account, they did not consider the effect
of the switching penalty. Aryafar et al. in [12] studied the net-
work selection dynamics in heterogeneous wireless networks
under two classes of throughput models. They characterized
the Pareto-efficiency of the equilibria and proposed a network
selection algorithm with hysteresis mechanism. Following the
work in [12], Monsef et al. in [13] first considered a client-
centric network selection model for autonomous user decision,
and characterized the convergence time and conditions. They
further studied a hybrid client-network model, where a user
is allowed to switch network if this decision is in line with
the network controller’s potential function. Mahindra et al. in
[14] considered the practical implementation of the intelligent
network selection in LTE and Wi-Fi networks. The system
consists of an interface assignment algorithm that dynamically
assigns user flows to interfaces and an interface switching
service that performs seamless interface switching for HTTP-
based flows. Hu et al. in [15] proposed an adaptive network
selection algorithm based on the attractor selection mechanism
for the users to dynamically select the suitable access points.
Both the offloading effectiveness and traffic delay were con-
sidered as the performance metrics. In summary, the network
selection problem considering the network congestion and
switching penalty in data offloading has not been explored
in the literature.
In this paper, we jointly consider both the network conges-
tion and switching penalty and address the practical consider-
ations of user mobility, and location, user, and time dependent
Wi-Fi availabilities. For the user mobility, we assume that the
operator only has the statistical information about the users’
mobility patterns, which capture their daily movement habits
[16]. We also consider several general assumptions on the Wi-
Fi availabilities. First, we assume that the Wi-Fi availability
is location-dependent, because Wi-Fi access points (APs) are
only available at some limited locations due to their smaller
coverages. Second, it may be time-dependent due to the access
policies of the administrators of the Wi-Fi APs. For example,
some Wi-Fi APs may be configured in the open access mode
when the owner is away, but in the closed access mode when
the owner is back. Third, it may be user-dependent, as users
who have subscribed to different data plans or Wi-Fi services
(e.g., Skype Wi-Fi) can have different privileges to access
different Wi-Fi networks. Given these practical considerations
with heterogeneous users and networks, the network selection
problem is very challenging to tackle.
Due to the coupling of the users’ decisions in causing the
network congestion, we apply the non-cooperative game the-
ory to study this congestion-aware network selection problem.
More specifically, with the statistical information on users’
mobility patterns, we formulate the users’ network selections
over a period of multiple time slots as a Bayesian game [17]. In
general, it is difficult to characterize the existence and conver-
gence of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, we are
able to show that the formulated game is a Bayesian potential
game [18], which enables us to design a distributed network
selection (DNS) with some nice convergence properties. It
should be noted that convergence is important for congestion-
aware network selections, where users switch networks based
on the experienced network congestion levels. Without con-
vergence guarantees, the system may result in oscillations. In
addition, as a benchmark, we show that computing the socially
optimal solution that maximizes the users’ aggregate utilities
in a centralized setting is an NP-hard problem.
In summary, the main contributions of our work are as
follows:
• Practical modeling: We study the users’ network selec-
tion problem by taking into account the practical issues
of network congestion, switching penalties, and statisti-
cal information of the users’ various possible mobility
patterns.
• NP-hard centralized network allocation benchmark: We
show that maximizing the users’ aggregate utilities is an
NP-hard problem, which motivates us to consider the
distributed setting.
• Distributed network selection algorithm: We formulate
the users’ network selection interactions as a Bayesian
game. We show that it is a potential game, derive its
closed-form exact potential function, and propose a prac-
tical DNS algorithm with nice convergence properties.
• Load balancing: Simulation results show that the pro-
posed DNS scheme achieves a good fairness and im-
proves the user utility of the cellular-only and OTSO
schemes by 66.7% under a medium switching cost. We
also show that the OTSO scheme performs reasonably
well with a low switching cost and a low Wi-Fi avail-
ability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first de-
scribe the system model in Section II. We study the centralized
network allocation and the distributed network selection game
in Sections III and IV, respectively. We present the simulation
results in Section V and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we discuss the system model for the network
selection in the integrated cellular and Wi-Fi networks. More
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Fig. 1. An example of the integrated cellular and Wi-Fi network, where N =
{0, 1, 2} is the set of networks and L = {1, . . . , 16} is the set of locations.
In each time slot, a user can remain idle (i.e., choose the auxiliary network 0),
access the cellular network (i.e., network 1) or the Wi-Fi network (i.e., network
2) if available, as the Wi-Fi availability is user, location, and time dependent.
Each user may have multiple possible mobility patterns, where the operator
has incomplete information on their probability distributions. We consider the
users’ network selections across a time period of multiple time slots by taking
into account the user mobility, network congestion, and switching penalties.
specifically, we describe the networks setting in Section II-A
and a user’s network availability and mobility pattern in
Section II-B. We present his action as a network-time routes
in Section II-C and his utility function in Section II-D.
A. Network Setting
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider an integrated cellular
and Wi-Fi system, where the Wi-Fi networks are tightly
integrated with the cellular network in terms of the radio
frequency coordination and network management [19]. Let
N = {0, 1, . . . , N} be the set of N + 1 networks, where
network n = 1 corresponds to the cellular network and
network n ∈ Nwifi = {2, . . . , N} corresponds to a Wi-Fi
network. We introduce an auxiliary idle network n = 0 to
model the situation that the user chooses to remain idle and is
not actively using any networks. The network parameters are
described as follows.
Definition 1 (Network Parameters): Each network n ∈ N
is associated with:
• Network capacity µ[n]: The maximum total amount of
data rate that network n can serve the users in each time
slot.
• Switching cost c[n, n′]: The cost incurred by a user when
he switches from network n ∈ N to network n′ ∈ N . It
can account for additional power consumption and QoE
disruption [6] during network switching.
• Switching time δ[n, n′]: The delay incurred by a user
when he switches from network n ∈ N to network
n′ ∈ N , which is the total number of time slots required
to tear down the old connection of network n and setup
the new connection of network n′. It corresponds to the
delay during handoff between different wireless networks.
To account for the fact that there is no network switching
when a user keeps using network n ∈ N , we have c[n, n] = 0
and δ[n, n] = 0, ∀n ∈ N . For the idle network, we make the
following additional practical assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Idle network): (a) µ[0] = 0; (b) The switch-
ing time through the idle network satisfies
δ[n, n′] + δ[n′, n′′] ≥ δ[n, 0] + δ[0, n′′], ∀n, n′, n′′ ∈ N\{0}.
(1)
(c) The switching cost through the idle network satisfies
c[n, n′] + c[n′, n′′] > c[n, 0] + c[0, n′′], ∀n, n′, n′′ ∈ N\{0}.
(2)
Assumption 1(a) implies that a user cannot receive any data
during the idle state. Assumption 1(b) accounts for the fact
that an idle state requires less time to “setup” or “tear down”
than switching through a third network n′. Assumption 1(c)
captures the additional power and signalling overhead during
handovers that involves one more network n′.2
B. User Setting
Let I = {1, . . . , I} be the set of users, L = {1, . . . , L} be
the set of locations, and T = {1, . . . , T} be the set of time
slots. We define a user’s network availability3 and mobility
pattern as follows.
Definition 2 (User’s Network Availability and Mobility Pat-
tern): A user i ∈ I is associated with:
• User, location, and time dependent network availabilities
M[i, l, t] ⊆ N : The set of networks available for user
i ∈ I at location l ∈ L and time t ∈ T .4
• Mobility pattern θi = (l[i, t] ∈ L, ∀ t ∈ T ) ∈ Θi:
The locations of user i in the period of T time slots
due to his mobility, where l[i, t] is the position of user
i at time t, and Θi is the set of all possible mobility
patterns of user i given his initial location at time t = 1.
Each user may have multiple mobility patterns. As an
example, in Fig. 1, for a total of T = 4 slots, user i has
two possible mobility patterns: θ(1)1 = (14, 15, 16, 16)
and θ(2)1 = (14, 10, 9, 13), so Θ1 = {θ(1)1 ,θ(2)1 }. We
also refer to θi as the type of user i.
• Prior Probability on Mobility Pattern p(θi) ≥ 0: The
probability that user i chooses mobility pattern θi.5 We
have
∑
θi∈Θi p(θi) = 1. As an example in Fig. 1, we
have p(θ(1)1 ) = 0.8 and p(θ
(2)
1 ) = 0.2.
We refer to this general mobility setting as the random
mobility pattern case. It includes the special case of determin-
istic mobility pattern, where the user knows his own mobility
pattern accurately.
2It is possible to use strict inequalities in both (1) and (2). However, since
the switching time is an integer in this paper, it is more practical to consider
an inequality in (1).
3Our modeling on network availability is quite general as it allows each
location to have more than one Wi-Fi access points (APs) and each AP to
cover more than one location. Thus, there can be overlapping coverage areas of
different networks. Also, it is a straightforward extension to consider multiple
cellular networks (e.g., deployed by different mobile operators), and assum e
that each location can be covered by an arbitrary number of these networks.
4For the rest of the paper, we will assume that the idle network is available
for all the users at all possible locations and time slots, so that network
0 ∈M[i, l, t], ∀ i ∈ I, l ∈ L, t ∈ T .
5Thus, p(θi) is a system parameter on user i’s mobility, which can be
collected from the mobile device automatically in the background.
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Fig. 2. Heterogeneous network availabilities of user 1 and user 2 shown in
Fig. 1 under mobility patterns θ1 = (14, 15, 16, 16) and θ2 = (4, 8, 12, 16).
Here, a grey block means that the network is available (i.e., network n ∈
N [i, t]) and a white block means that the network is not available.
Given user i’s mobility pattern and the network availabili-
ties, we can compute his available set of networks at time t
as6
N [i, t] =M[i, l[i, t], t]. (3)
An example of N [i, t] is given in Fig. 2.
C. Network-Time Route as Action
After describing a user’s network availability and mobility,
we define his action as his network selections across multiple
time slots, which is referred to as network-time route define
below. Let R˜i be the set of all possible network-time routes of
user i. Given user i’s mobility pattern θi, we let Ri(θi) ⊆ R˜i
be the set of all feasible network-time route of user i define
as follows.
Definition 3 (Feasible Network-Time Route): Given user
i’s mobility pattern θi, his feasible network-time route is a
sequence
ri =
(
(n1i , t
1
i ), (n
2
i , t
2
i ), . . . , (n
Qi
i , t
Qi
i )
)
∈ R˜i, (4)
which indicates user i’s network selections in all time slots,
except those time slots when user i is in the middle of network
switching and is not associated with any network. It satisfies
the following conditions:
1) Causality: 1 = t1i < t
2
i < . . . < t
Qi
i ≤ T .
2) Eligibility: nqi ∈ N [i, tqi ], for each q ∈ {1, . . . , Qi}.
3) Switching time: tq+1i − tqi = δ[nqi , nq+1i ] + 1, for each
q ∈ {1, . . . , Qi − 1}.
Condition 1) accounts for the fact that time is always
increasing. Condition 2) ensures that user i is eligible to select
the networks according to their availabilities as defined in
(3). Condition 3) ensures that the time difference between
successive elements in the sequence of network-time route is
consistent with the switching time between the corresponding
networks. More specifically, when nqi = n
q+1
i , it means that
user i keeps using the same network at the next time slot. With-
out involving any network switching, we have tq+1i − tqi = 1
6As a result, we will focus on N [i, t], instead of M[i, l, t], for the rest of
the paper.
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Fig. 3. The network-time routes chosen by the two users when switching
time δ[1, 2] = 1.
since δ[n, n] = 0, ∀n ∈ N . When nqi 6= nq+1i , it means that
user i switches from network nqi to n
q+1
i . Therefore, user i
can use network nq+1i after finishing the switching process,
which takes switching time of δ[nqi , n
q+1
i ].
To facilitate the introduction of the user’s utility function
in the next subsection, we define the network-time points of
a feasible network-time route as the network-time selections
along it.
Definition 4 (Network-time points): Given a feasible route
ri ∈ Ri(θi) in (4), we define its network-time points as the
set
V(ri) =
{
(n1i , t
1
i ), (n
2
i , t
2
i ), . . . , (n
Qi
i , t
Qi
i )
}
. (5)
The set can also be represented as the Qi − 1 network-time
point pairs
E(ri) =
{(
(nqi , t
q
i ), (n
q+1
i , t
q+1
i )
)
: q = 1, . . . , Qi − 1
}
, (6)
which are the consecutive pairs of network-time points visited
by user i in route ri.
An example of the feasible network-time routes is
shown in Fig. 3. In this example, we have r1 =(
(1, 1), (2, 3), (2, 4)
)
, so V(r1) = {(1, 1), (2, 3), (2, 4)} and
E(r1) =
{(
(1, 1), (2, 3)
)
,
(
(2, 3), (2, 4)
)}
. The pair of
network-time points
(
(1, 1), (2, 3)
)
means that user 1 accesses
network 1 at time slot 1, and switches to network 2 at time
slot 3 after taking one time slot of switching time. The pair
of network-time points
(
(2, 3), (2, 4)
)
denotes that user 1
accesses network 2 at time slot 3, and keeps using network 2
at time slot 4. The corresponding network selections of users
at 1 and 2 at different locations and time slots are illustrated
in Fig. 4.
D. Utility Function
For the design of a practical congestion-aware network
selection algorithm, a user’s utility function should take both
the network congestion and the negative impact of ping-pong
effect into account. Let ω[(n, t), r,θ] = |j ∈ I : (n, t) ∈
V(rj), rj ∈ Rj(θj)| be the network congestion level, which
counts the number of network-time routes chosen in action
profile r = (r1, . . . , rI) that pass through the network-time
point (n, t) under mobility patterns θ = (θ1, . . . ,θI). In other
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Fig. 4. The network selections of users 1 and 2 at different locations in the four time slots.
words, it denotes the total number of users accessing network
n at time t. For a route ri ∈ Ri(θi) in (4), user i’s utility
function consists of two parts:
• Total throughput: The summation of user i’s achieved
throughput over all the network-time points along route
ri (i.e., set V(ri) in (5)). At each network-time point
(n, t), the achieved throughput of user i is the network
capacity µ[n] divided by the network congestion level
ω[(n, t), r,θ].
• Total switching cost: The summation of the switch-
ing costs for network switching of every network-time
point pairs in route ri (i.e., set E(ri) in (6)). More
specifically, for each network-time point pair e =(
(nqi , t
q
i ), (n
q+1
i , t
q+1
i )
) ∈ E(ri), we define its switching
cost as
g[e] = g
[
(nqi , t
q
i ), (n
q+1
i , t
q+1
i )
]
= c[nqi , n
q+1
i ]. (7)
Overall, given the action profile r and mobility patterns θ
of all users, if ri ∈ Ri(θi), user i’s utility function is
Ui(r,θ) =
∑
(n,t)∈V(ri)
µ[n]
ω[(n, t), r,θ]
−
∑
e∈E(ri)
g[e]. (8)
III. CENTRALIZED NETWORK ALLOCATION
One natural formulation is to consider the centralized net-
work allocation that maximizes the users’ aggregate utilities.
However, we show that this would be an NP-hard problem
even in the special case of deterministic mobility pattern,
where the users’ mobility patterns are known.7
7It should be noted that in the general case with random mobility patterns,
we will consider the maximization of the users’ aggregate expected utilities,
which involves solving a number of network allocation problems under the
deterministic mobility pattern in the form of problem (9). In other words, if
problem (9) is NP-hard, then the problem under the random mobility case is
also NP-hard.
We first formally define a centralized socially optimal
network allocation as follows.
Definition 5 (Socially Optimal Network Allocation): Given
the deterministic mobility patterns θ, an action profile r∗ is a
socially optimal network allocation if it maximizes the social
welfare:
r∗ = arg max
ri∈Ri(θi), ∀ i∈I
W(r,θ) ,
∑
i∈I
Ui(r,θ), (9)
where the social welfare W(r,θ) is defined as the users’
aggregate utility.
With Assumption 1 in Section II-A, we can show that there
always exists a socially optimal network allocation that each
network-time point is chosen by at most one user.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1 and the given determin-
istic mobility patterns θ, there always exists a socially op-
timal network allocation r∗ such that the congestion level
ω[(n, t), r∗,θ] ≤ 1, for all network-time points (n, t) ∈
N × T .
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A. With Lemma
1, we can show that the problem of finding a socially optimal
network allocation is NP-hard.
Theorem 1: The problem of finding a socially optimal
network allocation in (9) is NP-hard.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B. Thus, solv-
ing the centralized network allocation problem is infeasible
for practical system with a potentially large number of users,
networks, and mobility patterns. Moreover, it is more practical
to study the scenario that the users are autonomously selecting
the networks themselves, rather than the operator controlling
their network choices. This motivates us to formulate the
distributed network selection problem as a non-cooperative
game, as we discuss next.
6IV. DISTRIBUTED NETWORK SELECTION GAME
In this section, we formulate the users’ network selections
with incomplete information as a distributed network selection
game (NSG). We first describe the non-cooperative game for-
mulation in Section IV-A. We then show that it is a Bayesian
potential game with the finite improvement property and derive
its exact potential function in closed-form in Section IV-B.
Finally, we proposed a distributed network selection (DNS)
algorithm to coordinate the users’ decisions in Section IV-C.
A. Network Selection Game with Incomplete Information
In practice, each user may only have incomplete information
of the types (i.e., mobility patterns) of all the users (even
including himself) at the beginning of the time period. More
specifically, we assume that the users’ types θ follow a known
prior probability distribution p(θ1, . . . ,θI).8 In addition, the
utility functions, available actions, possible types, and the
prior distributions of user types are assumed to be public
information. We then formulate the network selection game
as a Bayesian game [17] as follows.
Definition 6 (Network Selection Game): A network selection
game is a tuple Ω = (I, R˜,Θ, p,U) defined by:
• Players: The set of users I.
• Actions: The set of action profiles of all the users is R˜ =
R˜1 × . . .× R˜I .
• Types: The set of type space of all the users is Θ =
Θ1× . . .×ΘI , where Θi is the set of possible mobility
patterns of user i.
• Prior information: The common prior probability
p(θ1, . . . ,θI) over the types of all users.
• Utilities: The vector U = (Ui, ∀ i ∈ I) contains the
utility functions of the users defined in (8).
Under this Bayesian game setting, user i’s strategy is a
mapping si : Θi → R˜i, which specifies user i’s action for each
possible type. In other words, si(θi) specifies the network-
time route that user i should choose given his mobility pattern
θi. Let θ = (θ1, . . . ,θI) ∈ Θ be the users’ type profile. So
s(θ) =
(
s1(θ1), . . . , sI(θI)
)
is the action profile of all the
users given that their type profile is θ. The expected utility of
user i under strategy profile s is
EUi(s) =
∑
θ∈Θ
Ui
(
s(θ),θ
)
p(θ). (10)
Let s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sI) denote the strategies
of all the users except user i. A strategy profile can be written
as s = (si, s−i). Let Si be the strategy space of user i and
let S = S1 × . . . × SI be the strategy space of all the users.
We define the Bayesian Nash equilibrium [17] as follows.
8It is possible that this prior information on mobility patterns can be
obtained from the mobile operator. However, as we will discuss in Section
IV-C, the actual implementation of the DNS algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1) only
requires the aggregate network usage statistics from the operator, instead of
the detailed users’ mobility information, so there are no privacy concerns in
the proposed algorithm.
Definition 7 (Bayesian Nash equilibrium): The strategy
profile s∗ is a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE)9
if
s∗i = arg max
si∈Si
EUi(si, s
∗
−i), ∀ i ∈ I. (11)
B. Bayesian Potential Game
In general, it is difficult to establish the analytical results
of the BNE. Nevertheless, in this subsection, we are able to
show that Ω is a Bayesian potential game [18], which exhibits
the finite improvement property. It thus implies the existence
of and the convergence to the BNE.
First, we present the definition of a Bayesian potential game
[18].
Definition 8 (Bayesian Potential Game): Bayesian Game Ω
is a Bayesian potential game if there exists an exact potential
function Φ(r,θ) such that
Ui(ri,r−i,θ)−Ui(r′i,r−i,θ) = Φ(ri, r−i,θ)−Φ(r′i, r−i,θ),
∀ ri, r′i ∈ Ri(θi),θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ I.10
(12)
In other words, Bayesian potential game is a Bayesian game,
where the change in the value of the utility function is equal
to the change in the value of the potential function when the
action profile changes.
Theorem 2: Game Ω is a Bayesian potential game with the
exact potential function given by
Φ(r,θ) =
∑
(n,t)∈N×T
ω[(n,t),r,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
−
∑
i∈I
∑
e∈E(ri)
g[e]. (13)
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix C.
1) Properties of the Bayesian Potential Game: Before
stating the convergence properties of the users’ interactions,
let us recall some definitions [21].
Definition 9 (Better and best response updates): Starting
from a strategy profile s = (si, s−i), a better response update
is an event where a single user i changes his strategy from
si ∈ Si to s′i ∈ Si, and increases his expected utility as a
result, i.e., EUi(s′i, s−i) > EUi(si, s−i).
A best response update is a special type of better response
update, where the newly selected strategy s′i maximizes user
i’s expected utility among user i’s all possible better response
updates.
Definition 10 (Finite improvement property): A Bayesian
game possesses the finite improvement property (FIP) when
asynchronous11 better response updates always converge to a
BNE (defined in Definition 7) within a finite number of steps,
irrespective of the initial strategy profile or the users’ updating
order.
9Alternatively, we may define the BNE based on each user i’s ex-interim
expected utility EUi(si, s∗−i|θi) [17], where user i knows his own type
θi. In this case, the strategy profile s∗ is a pure strategy BNE if s∗i =
arg maxsi∈Si EUi(si, s
∗
−i|θi), ∀θi ∈ Θi, i ∈ I. However, Theorem I
in [20] showed that such an alternative definition is equivalent to the BNE
defined in (11), where user i knows nothing about any user’s actual type
(including his own type).
11Asynchronous updates imply that there will be no two users updating
their strategies at the same time.
7The FIP implies that better response updating always leads
to a pure strategy BNE, which implies the existence of pure
strategy BNE. As a result, it ensures the efficient convergence
of the users’ network selection to an equilibrium point and
thus the stability of the system.
Theorem 3: Game Ω possesses the finite improvement
property.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix D.
C. Algorithm Design
With the nice FIP just derived, we propose a distributed
network selection (DNS) algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1) for the
users to make their network selection decisions autonomously.
This algorithm relies on the network information obtained
from the operator in Algorithm 2. Different from the Bayesian
game setting discussed above that requires the prior informa-
tion of the users’ mobility, we design the DNS algorithm in
a way that it only requires the users to report their network
selection statistics. Thus, it eliminates the privacy concern of
asking users to reveal their mobility information.
1) Algorithm 1: To initialize, a user inputs his destination
on the mobile device (line 1). Based on his current location
(e.g., obtained from global positioning system (GPS)) and
mobility history, the device can compute the user’s possible
trajectories and the corresponding probabilities (line 2). The
device then queries the subscription plan (line 3) and network
parameters (line 4) on behalf of the users to determine the
available network resources.
Next, we describe the best response update of user i:
• Network information collection: Let Γi be the set of
time slots (line 6) that user i updates his strategy, which
corresponds to a network-time route for each of his
possible type θi (line 7). Based on the user, location,
and time availability of the networks, the device computes
user i’s available networks (line 8) and his set of feasible
network-time routes (line 9).12
• Best response computation: Let p−i[q, (n, t)] be the
probability that the network-time point (n, t) would be
occupied by q users (i.e., the congestion level is q) given
a set I\{i} of users, where q = 0, . . . , I − 1. With this
information on the probability mass function (pmf) of
congestion level in each network at different time from
the operator in Algorithm 2 (line 10), each user performs
a best response update to maximize his expected utility13
ui(ri|θi) for choosing route ri given that his type is
θi (line 11), where the first and second terms on the
right hand side of (14) represent the expected throughput
and switching cost for choosing route ri, respectively.
Each best response update can be computed by applying
a shortest path algorithm [22], such as Bellman-Ford
algorithm, and can be performed in an asynchronous
12The operator can obtain the Wi-Fi network information if the Wi-Fi APs
are deployed by the operator. For other Wi-Fi APs, it is possible to obtain
this information from other operators under roaming agreements.
13For notational simplicity, we define ui(ri|θi) as the expected utility in
the algorithm, which is actually equal to EUi(si, s−i|θi).
Algorithm 1 Distributed network selection (DNS) algorithm
for user i ∈ I.
Initialization
1: User’s input: Destination.
2: Compute the set Θi of possible trajectories and the corresponding
probability p(θi) ≥ 0 for each θi ∈ Θi based on the user’s
current location and mobility history, such that
∑
θi∈Θi p(θi) =
1.
3: Query user i’s subscription plan M[i, l, t] ∀ l ∈ L, t ∈ T from
the operator’s database.
4: Query network parameters from the operator’s database: network
capacity µ[n], ∀n ∈ N , switching time δ[n, n′], and switching
cost c[n, n′], ∀n, n′ ∈ N , n 6= n′.
Planning Phase: Bayesian Network Selection Game
5: repeat
6: if τ ∈ Γi
7: for θi ∈ Θi
8: Compute network availabilities N [i, t] :=M[i, l[i, t], t],
∀ t ∈ T for trajectory θi = (l[i, t], ∀ t ∈ T ).
9: Determine set Ri(θi) of feasible network-time routes
from N [i, t] and switching time δ[n, n′], ∀n, n′ ∈ N
by Definition 3.
10: Obtain pmf p−i[q, (n, t)] for q = 0, . . . , I − 1 for all
(n, t) ∈ N × T from the operator (see Algorithm 2).
11: Perform a best response update for type θi, by
identifying a route ri ∈ Ri(θi) that maximizes
user i’s expected utility given that his type is θi:
ui(ri|θi) :=
∑
(n,t)∈V(ri)
I−1∑
q=0
(
µ[n]
q + 1
)
p−i[q, (n, t)]−
∑
e∈E(ri)
g[e].
(14)
12: Update the strategy si(θi) := ri.
13: end for
14: Compute the network selection statistics under strategy si:
pi[n, t] :=
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi)× 1(n,t)∈V(si(θi)), ∀ (n, t) ∈ N × T ,
(15)
where 1{.} is the indicator function.
15: Report the network selection statistics
pi := (pi[n, t], ∀ (n, t) ∈ N × T ) to the operator.
16: end if
17: until τ ≥ τmax.
Network Selection Phase
18: User i determines his actual trajectory θi.
19: Select networks in different time slots based on action si(θi).
fashion by the users until reaching the iteration limit14 of
τmax, which represents the maximum number of iterations
that the algorithm will run (line 17).
• Information exchange: Each user needs to report his
individual network selection statistics to the operator, so
that the operator can calculate the aggregate network
congestion statistics by Algorithm 2. Let pi[n, t] be
the probability that user i would access network-time
point (n, t) under strategy si. After the strategy si is
determined, the device computes pi[n, t] by summing the
probability p(θi) that network-time point (n, t) is chosen
in the action si(θi) in (15) (line 14) and reports the net-
work selection statistics pi = (pi[n, t], ∀ (n, t) ∈ N ×T )
14According to FIP, the algorithm will always converge in a finite number of
iterations. However, we add this iteration limit to ensure that the convergence
does not take too long, thus allows the tradeoff between the performance and
convergence time. In our simulation in Section V, we choose τmax = 20.
8Algorithm 2 Information update algorithm for the mobile
operator.
Initialization
1: Establish subscription plan database for users to retrieve:
M[i, l, t] ∀ i ∈ I, l ∈ L, t ∈ T .
2: Establish network parameter database for users to retrieve: Net-
work capacity µ[n], ∀n ∈ N , switching time δ[n, n′], and
switching cost c[n, n′], ∀n, n′ ∈ N , n 6= n′.
3: Allocate memory for the users’ network selection statistics
pi, ∀ i ∈ I.
4: Synchronize the clock timer τ := 1 with all the users.
Information Update for Bayesian NSG in Algorithm 1
5: repeat
6: if network congestion update request is received from user i
7: Calculate the pmf p−i[q, (n, t)] of the congestion level
q = 0, . . . , I − 1 for all user i ∈ I and (n, t) ∈ N × T ,
and update in the database:
p−i[q, (n, t)] :=
∑
M∈M−i(q)
( ∏
m∈M
pm[n, t]
)( ∏
k∈I\M∪{i}
(
1−pk[n, t]
))
.
(16)
8: end if
9: Set τ := τ + 1.
10: until τ ≥ τmax.
of all the network-time points to the operator (line 15).
• Network selection: After that, once user i’ actual tra-
jectory θi is determined (line 18), he will choose the
network-times points based on his action si(θi) (line 19).
2) Algorithm 2: Then, we describe how the operator
can compute the aggregate network congestion statistics
p−i[q, (n, t)] in Algorithm 2. Based on the information pj [n, t]
obtained from other users j ∈ I\{i}, the operator compute
p−i[q, (n, t)] in (16) by counting the probabilities of the
network selection with congestion level q (excluding user i).
We define M−i(q) as the set of all possible subsets of set
I\{i} with q users. As an example, for I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, we
have M−3(2) =
{{1, 2}, {1, 4}, {2, 4}}.
3) Computational Complexity: We are interested in under-
standing how long it takes to converge to a pure strategy BNE
in the planning phase in Algorithm 1. Theorem 4 ensures that
each best response update (i.e., lines 7-13 in Algorithm 1) can
be computed efficiently in polynomial time.
Theorem 4: Each best response update of user i can be
computed in O(|Θi|N3T 3) time.
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix E. For the
number of best response updates required for convergence, we
will study it in the next section through numerical examples.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we study the performance of our DNS
algorithm by comparing it with two benchmark schemes over
various system parameters. More specifically, to evaluate the
users’ level of satisfaction and to understand the network
selections of these schemes, we evaluate the user utility,
fairness, and the amount of network switching. We also show
the impact of the prior probabilities of the mobility patterns
on the network selections.
A. Parameters and Settings
For each set of system parameters, we run the simulations
10000 times with randomized network settings and users’ mo-
bility patterns in MATLAB and show the average value. Unless
specified otherwise, the cellular (LTE category 5) network
capacity µ[1] and the Wi-Fi network capacity µ[n], n ∈ Nwifi
are normally distributed random variables with means equal
to 300 Mbps [23] and 54 Mbps15 [24], respectively, with
standard deviations equal to 5 Mbps. The probability that a
Wi-Fi connection is available at a particular location pwifi is
equal to 0.5. We consider a two-minute duration, where the
duration of a time slot ∆t = 10 seconds, so T = 12. We
assume that the network switching time is equal to one (i.e.,
δ[n, n′] = 1, ∀n, n′ ∈ N , n 6= n′). For the switching cost not
involving the idle network, we assume that they are the same
that c[n, n′] = cswitch, ∀n, n′ ∈ N\{0}, n 6= n′. However,
the switching cost involving the idle network is halved (i.e.,
c[0, n] = c[n, 0] = cswitch/2, ∀n ∈ N ) such that (2) in
Assumption 1(c) is satisfied. We consider that all the Wi-Fi
networks are available to all the users within its coverage all
the time.
In our performance evaluation, we compare our DNS
scheme against two benchmark schemes:
• Cellular-only scheme: The users use the cellular network
all the time to avoid network switching, hence there is
no data offloading.
• On-the-spot offloading (OTSO) scheme: It is an of-
floading policy commonly used in most mobile devices
today [25], where the data traffic is offloaded to Wi-Fi
network whenever Wi-Fi is available. Otherwise, if Wi-Fi
networks are not available soon, the cellular connection
will be used.
B. Performance Evaluations of Deterministic Mobility Pat-
terns
In this subsection, we first evaluate the schemes in the
deterministic mobility pattern case. Here, the users’ deter-
ministic mobility patterns are generated based on the same
location transition matrix P = [p(l′ | l)]L×L, where p(l′ | l) is
the probability that a user will move to location l′ given that
it is currently at location l.16 All user move around L = 16
possible locations in a four by four grid (similar to that in
Fig. 1). The probability that the user stays at a location is
p(l | l) = 0.6, ∀ l ∈ L. Moreover, it is equally likely for
the user to move to any one of the neighbouring locations.
Take location 7 in Fig. 1 as an example, the probability that
the user will move to locations 3, 6, 8, or 11 is equal to
(1 − 0.6)/4 = 0.1. For the edge location 12, however, the
probability of moving to any one of its three neighbouring
locations is (1− 0.6)/3 = 0.133.
15Besides the difference in wireless communication standards, we consider
a mean cellular network capacity much higher than the mean Wi-Fi network
capacity, because the scale of the cellular network is larger and covers the
users in multiple locations, while a Wi-Fi AP covers users in one particular
location only.
16In our simulations, we just use the location transition matrix as a way
to generate the users’ mobility patterns. We want to clarify that it does not
matter how to generate the users’ locations as long as they are given as system
parameters in this paper.
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the network selection of DNS, OTSO, and cellular-only schemes with I = 15 users and cswitch = 400.
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cost cswitch for I = 30.
1) Illustration of Network Selection Schemes: In Fig. 5,
we illustrate the network selections under DNS, OTSO, and
cellular-only schemes for I = 15 users and a switching cost
cswitch = 400. We can see that the OTSO scheme prefers Wi-Fi
networks, so it results in a lot of network switching. On the
other extreme, the cellular-only scheme uses only the cellular
network, so there is no network switching.
2) Network Switching and Scalability: (Summary of ob-
servations) We first show that the DNS scheme is able to
adaptively choose the number of switching operations based
on the switching cost. We also show that the DNS scheme is
scalable by considering the number of best response updates
for convergence.
In Fig. 6, we plot the total number of network switching
operations against the switching cost cswitch for I = 30. We can
see that the performances of both the cellular-only and OTSO
schemes are static as they are independent of cswitch. However,
the DNS scheme responds to the increasing switching cost by
decreasing the number of switching.
In Theorem 4, we have established that each best response
update can be computed in polynomial time. In Fig. 7, we
continue with the evaluation of the convergence speed of
Algorithm 1 by counting the average number of best response
updates per user required for convergence with respect to
different I with cswitch = 400. We observe that Algorithm 1
scales well with the increasing user population. In particular,
each user only needs to perform 3.57 and 3.95 best response
updates on average for I = 20 and I = 50, respectively, before
the strategy profile converges to a pure strategy BNE.
3) Average User Utility: (Summary of observations) In
this subsection, we study the impact of various system pa-
rameters on the user utility. Overall, we find that the DNS
scheme achieves the highest utility by taking into account both
the ping-pong effect and Wi-Fi network congestion. The results
also reveal that the OTSO performs well under a low switching
cost and a low Wi-Fi availability.
In Fig. 8, we plot the average user utility against the switch-
ing cost cswitch for I = 30. First, we observe that the proposed
DNS scheme achieves the highest user utility compared with
OTSO and cellular-only schemes. More specifically, the DNS
scheme improves the utility of these two schemes by 66.7%
when cswitch = 550. In addition, for the DNS scheme, we see
that its utility decreases gradually with cswitch. This is because
DNS is aware of the increasing switching cost and thus reduces
the number of switching operations (as shown in Fig. 6), which
results in a milder reduction in utility. For the OTSO scheme,
as it is unaware of the switching cost, the average user utility
experiences a heavy reduction when cswitch is large. For the
cellular-only scheme, since it does not perform any network
switching, the user utility is independent of cswitch.
In Fig. 9, we plot the average user utility against the number
of users I for cswitch = 400. In general, when I increases, the
congestion level increases, so the average utility under all three
schemes decrease. We observe that the DNS scheme results
in the highest user utility, which suggests that it achieves a
good load balancing across the networks. For the cellular-only
scheme, since it does not access any available Wi-Fi network
capacity, the average user utility is significantly low.
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mean Wi-Fi data rate for I = 30 and cswitch =
400.
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probability of meeting Wi-Fi for I = 30 and
cswitch = 400.
In Fig. 10, we plot the average user utility against the mean
Wi-Fi data rate for I = 30 and cswitch = 400. We observe that
the result is intuitive, where the utility under both the DNS
and OTSO schemes increases with the mean Wi-Fi data rate.
Also, the DNS scheme achieves the highest user utility among
the three schemes.
Furthermore, we aim to study the impact of the probability
of meeting Wi-Fi pwifi on different schemes. Here, we compare
with an additional Wiffler scheme [7], which is a prediction-
based offloading scheme that operates as follows. Let ζ be
the estimated amount of data that can be transferred using
Wi-Fi by the deadline. If Wi-Fi is available in the current
location, then Wi-Fi will be used immediately. If Wi-Fi is
not available, the user needs to check whether the condition
ζ ≥ θk is satisfied, where k is the remaining size of the file to
be transferred, and θ > 0 is the conservative coefficient that
tradeoffs the amount of data offloaded with the completion
time of the file transfer. If this condition is satisfied, meaning
that the estimated data transfer using Wi-Fi is large enough,
then the user will stay idle and wait for the Wi-Fi connection.
Otherwise, the user will use the cellular connection. Here, we
set θ = 1 as suggested in [7] and consider k = 0.5 in the
simulation.
In Fig. 11, we plot the average user utility against the
probability of meeting Wi-Fi pwifi for I = 30 and cswitch = 400.
For the DNS scheme, we can see that the utility increases
with pwifi, as the users experience a lower level of network
congestion when more Wi-Fi networks are available. For the
OTSO scheme, we observe a similar trend from small to
medium pwifi. Surprisingly, it experiences a drop in utility
when pwifi is above 0.9. The reason is that when pwifi is high
such that Wi-Fi coverage is almost ubiquitous, all the users
would use the Wi-Fi networks all the time, making the Wi-
Fi networks very congested but leaving the cellular network
with almost no user. Thus, the average user utility at pwifi = 1
corresponds to the average throughput obtained from the Wi-
Fi networks only (i.e., excluding the cellular network) minus
the total switching cost. For the cellular-only scheme, since
it is independent of the Wi-Fi availability, the average user
utility is independent of pwifi. For the Wiffler scheme, when
pwifi < 0.5, it is the same as the OTSO scheme, which prefers
to use Wi-Fi network when it is available, but the cellular
network otherwise. However, when pwifi ≥ 0.5, it becomes
a Wi-Fi only scheme, which it will remain idle (instead of
using the cellular network) when Wi-Fi is not available. Thus,
its user utility increases with pwifi when more Wi-Fi networks
are available.
4) Fairness: (Summary of observations) In this subsec-
tion, we study the fairness of the network resource allocation
and show that the DNS scheme achieves a high degree
of fairness. In addition, the fairness of the OTSO scheme
decreases sharply under a high switching cost.
In Fig. 12, we evaluate the degree of fairness among
the users by plotting the Jain’s fairness index [26] defined
as
(∑
i∈I Ui(r,θ)
)2
/
(
I
∑
i∈I Ui(r,θ)
2
)
against cswitch for
I = 30. Since the users under the cellular-only scheme always
have the same utility, its fairness index is always equal to one.
Furthermore, we notice that the fairness indices of both the
DNS and OTSO schemes decrease with cswitch. For the DNS
scheme, as cswitch increases, the users switch networks less
often (as shown in Fig. 6). In this way, the utilities among the
users at a larger cswitch are less balanced than that at a smaller
cswitch, so the degree of fairness decreases with cswitch. For the
OTSO scheme, although its network selection is independent
of cswitch, the increase in cswitch widens the disparity in utilities
among the users with different number of network switching.
Moreover, we observe in Fig. 12 that the DNS scheme achieves
a higher fairness index than the OTSO scheme, and the fairness
index of the DNS scheme decreases much slowly than that of
the OTSO scheme. It suggests that the adaptive DNS scheme
results in a fairer resource allocation than the static OTSO
scheme.
C. Performance Evaluations of Random Mobility Patterns
In this subsection, we evaluate our proposed DNS scheme
under the random mobility pattern case. Here, we assume
that the cellular network capacity µ[1] and the Wi-Fi network
capacity µ[n], n ∈ Nwifi are normally distributed random
variables with means equal to 100 Mbps and 50 Mbps,
respectively, and standard deviations equal to 5 Mbps. The
probability of meeting Wi-Fi pwifi = 0.9. The switching
penalties are the same as that in Section V-B. We consider
a one-minute duration, so T = 6 for ∆t = 10 seconds. There
are I = 8 users moving around L = 5 possible locations on a
11
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probability phigh of high mobility for I = 8 and
cswitch = 10.
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prior probability phigh of high mobility for I =
8 and cswitch = 10.
straight road.17 For each set of system parameters, we run the
simulations 1000 times with randomized network settings and
users’ mobility patterns in MATLAB and show the average
value.
For each user in the random mobility pattern case here, we
consider that there are two possible mobility patterns that are
generated with different characteristics:
• High mobility: With a prior probability phigh, the user will
frequently move across L locations. In the simulation,
we assume that the user has a total probability of 0.9
in moving to one of his neighboring locations and a
probability of 0.1 in staying at his current location.
• Low mobility: With a prior probability 1−phigh, the user
moves much less frequently. In the simulation, we assume
that the user has a total probability of 0.1 in moving to
one of his neighboring locations and a probability of 0.9
in staying at his current location.
1) Impact of Prior Distribution of Mobility Patterns:
(Summary of observations) Consistent with the observations
under the deterministic mobility case, we see that the DNS
achieves the highest expected utility and a high level of
fairness under the random mobility case.
In Fig. 13, we plot the average expected utility against the
prior probability phigh of high mobility when switching cost
cswitch = 10. First, we can see that both the utilities under
the DNS and OTSO schemes decrease with phigh, because
of the higher total switching cost when the users switch
networks more often under a high mobility. Nevertheless, the
DNS scheme results in a higher expected user utility. For
the cellular-only scheme, since the users select the cellular
network regardless of their mobility, the user utility is inde-
pendent of phigh.
In Fig. 14, we plot the Jain’s fairness index [26](∑
i∈I EUi(s)
)2
/
(
I
∑
i∈I EUi(s)
2
)
against phigh for
cswitch = 10. We can see that the DNS scheme achieves a
higher degree of fairness than the OTSO scheme. Moreover,
for both the DNS and OTSO schemes, there is an increase in
fairness when phigh increases from a small value to a medium
17Due to the relatively higher complexity to execute the DNS algorithm
under the random mobility pattern case (especially the need to run 1000
times to have a good estimation of the average performance), we consider a
smaller scale of simulation in this subsection.
value. We observe that it is due to the larger percentage drop
in the expected utility for high-utility users, which increases
the fairness. However, for the OTSO scheme, there is a further
drop in fairness when phigh > 0.5, because the expected
utilities of some users (not necessarily the high-utility users)
decrease, which leads to a reduction in fairness.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the intelligent network selection
problem with the objective of achieving an effective data
offloading for cellular and Wi-Fi integration. In particular, we
focused on understanding the impact of network congestion
and switching penalty due to the herd behaviour and ping-
pong effect, respectively, which were not systematically con-
sidered in the literature. As a benchmark, we formulated the
centralized user utility maximization problem and showed that
it is an NP-hard problem, which motivated us to consider
a distributed approach. More specifically, with the statistical
information of the user mobility, we formulated the users’
interactions as a Bayesian network selection game, proved that
it is a potential game, and proposed a distributed network
selection (DNS) algorithm with provably nice convergence
properties. Compared with the on-the-spot offloading (OTSO)
and cellular-only schemes, our simulation results showed that
the proposed DNS algorithm results in the highest user utility
and a good fairness by avoiding Wi-Fi network congestion
and costly network switching. In addition, we showed that the
OTSO scheme performs especially well under a low switching
cost and a low Wi-Fi availability.
In this work, we considered the static setting where each
user knows the network conditions and the statistical infor-
mation of his possible mobility patterns. For the future work,
we plan to consider a dynamic setting where a user needs to
make online network selections, while considering the time-
varying network conditions and mobility patterns. Moreover,
we have remarked that the complexity of implementing the
DNS algorithm in the random mobility pattern case can be
high. Thus, it is important to design a low-complexity DNS
algorithm to converge to an approximate equilibrium of the
game, while still taking into account the network congestion,
switching penalty, and user mobility that we considered in this
paper. In addition, it is interesting to analyze the performance
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of the proposed scheme under the framework of stochastic
geometry [27].
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume on the
contrary that for a socially optimal action profile r∗, there
exists (n, t) ∈ N × T such that ω[(n, t), r∗,θ] > 1. Without
loss of generality, in r∗, we assume that there exists user i ∈ I
with route
r∗i =
(
(n1i , t
1
i ), . . . , (n
q−1
i , t
q−1
i ), (n
q
i , t
q
i ), (n
q+1
i , t
q+1
i ), . . . ,
(nQii , t
Qi
i )
)
,
(17)
where ω[(nqi , t
q
i ), r
∗,θ] > 1. We want to show that we can
always find another action profile r′ such that W(r∗,θ) ≤
W(r′,θ).
To do this, we define another action profile r′, where user i
chooses not to take the network-time point (nqi , t
q
i ) but remains
idle. The new route taken by user i is
r′i =
(
(n1i , t
1
i ), . . . , (n
q−1
i , t
q−1
i ),
(0, tq−1i + δ[n
q−1
i , 0] + 1), . . . , (0, t
q+1
i − δ[0, nq+1i ]− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
remains idle
,
(nq+1i , t
q+1
i ), . . . , (n
Qi
i , t
Qi
i )
)
,
(18)
which is a feasible network-time route (defined in Definition
3) by Assumption 1(b). However, all the other users choose the
same route as they did in r∗, i.e., r′j = r
∗
j for all j ∈ I\{i}.
Given the users’ deterministic mobility patterns θ, we define
the social welfare under action profile r as
W(r,θ) = benefit(r,θ)− cost(r)
= benefit(r,θ)−
∑
i∈I
costi(ri), (19)
where
W(r,θ) ,
∑
i∈I
Ui(r,θ), (20)
benefit(r,θ) ,
∑
i∈I
∑
(n,t)∈V(ri)
µ[n]
ω[(n, t), r,θ]
, (21)
and
costi(ri) =
∑
e∈E(ri)
g[e]. (22)
First, notice that we can express the total benefit in (21) as
benefit(r,θ) =
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
1{ω[(n,t),r,θ]≥1}µ[n], (23)
where 1{.} is the indicator function. Since the set of network-
time points with at least one user under r is the same as that
under r∗, we have from Assumption 1(a) and (23) that
benefit(r∗,θ) = benefit(r′,θ). (24)
Second, from Assumption 1(c), we have for user i that
costi(r∗i ) < costi(r
′
i). (25)
Third, the switching costs of other users remain the same
such that
costj(r∗j ) = costj(r
′
j), ∀ j ∈ I\{i}. (26)
Overall, substituting (24), (25), and (26) into (19), we have
W(r∗,θ) <W(r′,θ), (27)
which leads to a contradiction.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the NP-hardness by restriction [28]: We show
that finding the social welfare maximization solution in a
special case of a NSG can be transformed into a 3-dimensional
matching decision problem, which is NP-complete [28], [29].
First, we define the 3-dimensional matching and its corre-
sponding decision problem.
Definition 11 (3-dimensional matching): Let X , Y , and Z
be three finite disjoint sets. Let R ⊆ X × Y × Z be a set of
ordered triples, i.e., R = {(x, y, z) : x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z}.
Hence R′ ⊆ R is a 3-dimensional matching if for any two
different triples (x1, y1, z1) ∈ R′ and (x2, y2, z2) ∈ R′, we
have x1 6= x2, y1 6= y2, and z1 6= z2.
Definition 12 (3-dimensional matching decision problem):
Suppose |X | = |Y| = |Z| = N . Given an input R with |R| ≥
N , decide whether there exists a 3-dimensional matchingR′ ⊆
R with the maximum size |R′| = N .
Consider a restricted NSG with the following restrictions,
which is a special case of a NSG:
(a) Networks and time slots: We consider that there are
T = 3 time slots and N available networks, and we do not
consider the idle network. We assume that these N networks
are available to all the users at every location and time slot.
Sets X , Y , and Z represent the sets of available networks in
the three time slots, respectively, where |X | = |Y| = |Z| = N .
(b) Network-time route: Set R represents the set of feasible
network-time routes of all the users, i.e.,Ri(θi) = R, ∀ i ∈ I.
Assume that each user i can only choose one particular feasible
network-time route ri ∈ R. We assume that the number of
users I is large enough, such that the network-time routes of
all the users cover all the network-time points in X ∪ Y ∪Z ,
so |R| = I ≥ N . Consider R′ ⊆ R in Definition 12 that
represents a feasible network allocation. We assume that a
user, whose route is not chosen in R′, will remain idle all the
time and does not access any network.
(c) High network capacity: The benefit of using a network
without any contention is larger than the switching cost to the
network, i.e., µ[n] > c[n′, n] for all networks n, n′ ∈ N .
(d) Switching cost and switching time: The switching cost
does not depend on the user’s initial network configuration,
i.e., c[n, n′] = c˜[n′] for all n, n′ ∈ N , where c˜[n′] is the
switching cost to network n′ ∈ N . In other words, the
switching costs from network n to a particular network n′
for all n ∈ N are the same. Also, the switching time between
any two networks is zero. That is, δ[n, n′] = 0, ∀n, n′ ∈ N .
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Fig. 15. An example of 3-dimensional matching. Here, the set R consists of
the four grey areas, which represent the routes of users 1 to 4. The solution of
the 3-dimensional matching problem is the set R′ that consists of the routes
of users 1, 2, and 4. It is also the solution of the social welfare maximization
problem.
In the restricted NSG, restrictions (c) and (d) imply that
we can maximize the aggregate utility by covering all the
network-time points with any available users. Furthermore,
Lemma 1 implies that we can focus on an optimal solution,
where each network-time point should be chosen by at most
one user. So the optimal network allocation should not contain
any overlapping components (i.e., multiple users choosing the
same network-time point) as defined in Definition 11. Putting
the above discussions together, we know that in the aggregate
utility maximization solution, every element of X × Y × Z
(i.e., every network) should be contained in exactly one of
the triples (i.e., the network-time routes) in R′. In other
words, R′ ⊆ R is the optimal network allocation. So the
social welfare maximization problem can be transformed to
a 3-dimensional matching decision problem, which is NP-
complete [28], [29]. By restriction, we establish that the
problem of finding the social welfare maximization solution
of the NSG is NP-hard. An example is given in Fig. 15.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
In the proof, we want to show that the utility function in (8)
and the potential function in (13) satisfy (12). First, starting
from the original action profile r = (ri, r−i), we define a
new action profile r′, where r′j = rj if j 6= i and r′j 6= rj if
j = i. In other words, only user i changes its action from ri
to r′i in the new action profile r
′ = (r′i, r−i).
Next, we define an partition of set N × T , which consists
of four non-overlapping sets of the network-time points
B(1) = {(n, t) : (n, t) ∈ V(ri), (n, t) /∈ V(r′i)},
B(2) = {(n, t) : (n, t) /∈ V(ri), (n, t) ∈ V(r′i)},
B(3) = {(n, t) : (n, t) ∈ V(ri), (n, t) ∈ V(r′i)},
B(4) = {(n, t) : (n, t) /∈ V(ri), (n, t) /∈ V(r′i)},
(28)
where B(1) ∪ B(2) ∪ B(3) ∪ B(4) = N × T . As a result,
considering the difference in congestion level in network-time
point (n, t) between action profiles r and r′, we have
ω[(n, t), r,θ]−ω[(n, t), r′,θ] =

1, if (n, t) ∈ B(1),
−1, if (n, t) ∈ B(2),
0, if (n, t) ∈ B(3) ∪ B(4).
(29)
For example, in the first line in (29), we have one more user
(i.e., user i) choosing the network-time point (n, t) ∈ B(1) in
the action profile r = (ri, r−i) than in r′ = (r′i, r−i), since
users other than i choose the same action profile r−i.
Let A ,
∑
e∈E(r′i) g[e] −
∑
e∈E(ri) g[e]. As a result, we
have
Φ(ri, r−i,θ)− Φ(r′i, r−i,θ)
=
(∑
j∈I
∑
e∈E(r′j)
g[e]−
∑
j∈I
∑
e∈E(rj)
g[e]
)
+
∑
(n,t)∈N×T
(ω[(n,t),r,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
−
ω[(n,t),r′,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
)
=A+
∑
(n,t)∈B(1)∪B(2)∪B(3)∪B(4)
(ω[(n,t),r,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
−
ω[(n,t),r′,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
)
=A+
∑
(n,t)∈B(1)
(ω[(n,t),r,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
−
ω[(n,t),r′,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
)
+
∑
(n,t)∈B(2)
(ω[(n,t),r,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
−
ω[(n,t),r′,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
)
=A+
∑
(n,t)∈B(1)
µ[n]
ω[(n, t), r,θ]
−
∑
(n,t)∈B(2)
µ[n]
ω[(n, t), r′,θ]
=A+
∑
(n,t)∈B(1)∪B(3)
µ[n]
ω[(n, t), r,θ]
−
∑
(n,t)∈B(2)∪B(3)
µ[n]
ω[(n, t), r′,θ]
=A+
∑
(n,t)∈V(ri)
µ[n]
ω[(n, t), r,θ]
−
∑
(n,t)∈V(r′i)
µ[n]
ω[(n, t), r′,θ]
=Ui(ri, r−i,θ)− Ui(r′i, r−i,θ). (30)
Here, the first equality is due to the definition in (13). The
second equality is due to r′j = rj for j 6= i and B(1) ∪B(2) ∪
B(3) ∪ B(4) = N × T . The third equality is due to the fact
that
ω[(n,t),r,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
−
ω[(n,t),r′,θ]∑
q=1
µ[n]
q
= 0, for (n, t) ∈ B(3)∪B(4).
(31)
The fourth equality is due to the algebraic manipulation
based on (29). The fifth equality is due to ω[(n, t), r,θ] =
ω[(n, t), r′,θ] if (n, t) ∈ B(3) from (29). The sixth equality is
due to V(ri) = B(1) ∪B(3) and V(r′i) = B(2) ∪B(3). The last
equality is due to the definition in (8).
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D. Proof of Theorem 3
First, we define a function
Ψ(s) ,
∑
θ∈Θ
Φ
(
s(θ),θ
)
p(θ). (32)
We can show that
EUi(s)− EUi(s′) =
∑
θ∈Θ
(
Ui
(
s(θ),θ
)− Ui(s′(θ),θ))p(θ)
=
∑
θ∈Θ
(
Φ
(
s(θ),θ
)− Φ(s′(θ),θ))p(θ) = Ψ(s)−Ψ(s′),
(33)
where the first equality is due to the definition in (10). The
second equality is due to (12) and Theorem 2. Thus, Ψ(s) is
the potential function of game Ω. From [30], every finite game
with a potential function has the FIP.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
As illustrated in Fig. 3, in a network-time graph, the total
number of nodes V = NT . In the extreme case that every pair
of nodes is connected by an edge, the total number of edges
E ≈ V 2 = N2T 2. In computing the best response update for
each type θi of user i, due to the throughput and switching
cost terms with positive and negative impacts in the utility
function in (8), respectively, we need to apply a shortest path
algorithm that can handle both the positive and negative edge
costs [22]. It includes the Bellman-Ford algorithm, which has
a computational complexity of O(V E) = O(N3T 3). Overall,
since user i has |Θi| possible types for his strategy, each best
response update requires O(|Θi|N3T 3) time.
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